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Abstract 
 
       In this paper I would like to present the relationships between philosophy 
and metaphysics through some questions presented by Heidegger, Hegel and 
Husserl. What emerges at the end of the analyisis is a new intrinsic necessity 
for philosophy: its reconfiguration, as Leo Lugarini in his book Filosofia e 
Metafisica (1964) underlines.  
       From an historical point of view, the idea of philosophy has been 
associated for centuries with those of metaphysics in the strictly sense of onto-
logy: in other words the philosophy was thought as a research on the essence 
itself.  
       However, already from Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), 
philosophy has reconfigured itself as a ‘science of the experience of 
consciousness’ and, proceeding along the same path, Husserl has delineated a 
phenomenology of the Lebenswelt.  
      What remains then of metaphysics? 
       Is the point of philosophy to go beyond metaphysics, as Heidegger 
suggested?  
       Surely his disappointing question: ‘Why are there beings at all, and why 
not far rather Nothing?’ (1929) is a call for a necessary change of perspective: 
focus is not a prior essence but the being itself which enables the possibility of 
the essence. Nevertheless, Heidegger too goes on to build a metaphysical 
conception: the next step, taken by Hegel and later clarified by Husserl, is 
bringing the question of human acting to the middle of philosophy - of what 
happens in interiore homine. 
       This is the reconfiguration of philosophy that I would like to suggest in 
this paper and this new perspective in the history of philosophy can be 
considered as one of the greatest achievements of the phenomenological 
method. 
 
Contact Information of Corresponding author: sara.fumagalli@unimi.it 
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Introduction 
 
Looking at the relationships between philosophy and metaphysics, through 
some questions presented by Heidegger, Hegel and Husserl, Leo Lugarini 
highlights an intrinsic necessity for philosophy: its reconfiguration.  
The subtitle of the volume Philosophy and metaphysics
1
 is precisely 
Researches on the concept of philosophy
2
, and this is Lugarini’s central 
purpose. 
But, at the end of his research, will he be able to find an universal acceptable 
concept of philosophy?  
We will see that, through a critical historical analysis, the idea of philosophy 
has been associated for centuries with that of metaphysics in the strict sense of 
onto-logy: in other words, philosophy was conceived of as research on essence 
itself.  
       However, already Hegel in the Phenomenology of  spirit (1807) 
reconfigured philosophy as a science of the experience of consciousness and, 
proceeding along the same path, Husserl delineated a phenomenology of the 
Lebenswelt. 
      What remains then of metaphysics? 
       Is the point of philosophy to go beyond metaphysics, as Heidegger 
suggested? 
       Surely his disappointing question: Why are there beings at all, and why not 
far rather Nothing?
3
 is a call for a necessary change of perspective: focus is not 
a prior essence but the being itself which enables the possibility of the essence. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger too goes on to build a metaphysical conception: the 
next step, taken by Hegel and later clarified by Husserl, is bringing the 
question of human acting to the middle of philosophy - of what happens in 
interiore homine. 
       The question is not What is the essence?, but properly: For what reason do 
we pose the question of the essence? The ground could be only in our self and, 
consequently, it could not be definitively given from the outside but is given 
only in the movement of consciousness
4
, similarly to the idea of philosophy and 
the activity of philosophy itself.   
       The consciousness of this reconfiguration of philosophy is presented, in 
Hegel and Husserl, in the awareness of a crisis of the philosophy that has 
proceeded along its history.
5
  
Philosophy must have a meaning in our everyday, practical lives: the merit of 
Hegel’s Aufhebung is to have shown the different relationship between 
experience and truth, calling out the absurd pretention of the idea that our 
knowing analyzes an object from a different and higher point of view.  
                                                             
1Lugarini, L. (1964) Filosofia e metafisica, Urbino: Argalia. Translation from Italian to English 
by the Author. 
2 Translation by the Author. 
3Heidegger, M. (1929) What Is Metaphysics? in Pathmarks, edited by William McNeill, 
Cambridge University Press 1998, 96.  
4 As Hegel would have said.  
5 For the analysis of the crisis in Husserl see The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology (1935). 
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In fact, it is to say that we are always by the object and, though we don’t have 
consciousness of it yet, we are already and ever by philosophy, by being.  
       To this purpose, The unexpected answer
1
 of the painter René Magritte 
seems to me an illuminating example of the reconfiguration of philosophy: the 
master of Surrealism has painted a closed door of an apartment in which an 
unformed opening discloses the night. Supposing that the unformed opening is 
a human figure, this is what happens: if the door represents the threshold of 
philosophy it could not simply be opened with a mechanical and pre-
established action – like turning the door handle to enter – the man is already 
inside it, i.e. the man is at the middle of the door, at the middle of the being, 
without any possibility to go away to see the world from a privileged position. 
 
§ 1. Back to the roots of philosophy: the meta-physics and the essence itself 
 
Aristotle at the beginning of the first chapter of the Metaphysics book XII  
indicates the principle or the first cause which metaphysics attempts to analyze: 
the substance, i.e. the ousia. In reality the word «metaphysics» doesn’t come 
from Aristotle and, for instance, in his texts the philosopher used the term «first 
philosophy» to concern this field of knowledge which configures itself as 
research about first causes and principles.  
As Aristotle said at the beginning of the book IV, metaphysics is ‘ […] a 
science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to 
this in virtue of its own nature’2, this subject will be referred to with the our 
term «ontology».   
       Moreover the «first philosophy» has a further meaning: is a research about 
God, who is the supreme Principle and the absolute first Cause, for this reason 
metaphysics is «theological science» or simply theology as well. Such a 
science investigates objects above physics - precisely meta-physical objects - 
and, in this sense, it is properly meta-physics: its possession is not possible for 
the human being as we read in the first book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: ‘ […] 
“God alone can have this privilege”, and it is unfitting that man should not be 
content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him’.3 
       The distinctive metaphysical question What is being? has been from 
Aristotle identified with the question What is substance?, i.e. with a  question 
that aims to establish if a divine substance exists or not and which are its 
peculiar features.  
 
And indeed the question which, both now and of old, has always been 
raised, and always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the 
question, what is substance? For it is this that some assert to be one, 
others more than one, and that some assert to be limited in number, 
                                                             
1 See the figure at page 17.  
2Aristotle, Metaphysics, book IV in The complete works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes, vol. II, Bollingen Series LXXI, 2: Princeton University 
Press 1991, 1584. 
3 Ivi, book I, 1555. 
ATINER CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES No: PHI2012-0149 
8 
 
others unlimited. And so we also must consider chiefly and primarily and 
almost exclusively what that is which is in this sense.
1
  
 
Aristotle’s metaphysics configures itself indeed as a theory of substance and its 
question, more than be oriented to discover being itself, wants to look into the 
first essence of being itself through the embodiment of being, i.e. the 
substance. Aristotle imposes a strong mark on the meaning of first philosophy 
and after him metaphysical research will be oriented to highlight the quidditas 
of the essence itself. 
       At the beginning there was meta-physics onto-logical orientation, 
Aristotle’s first philosophy which poses at the center essence itself and 
considers wise the person who investigates the first principles and causes of the 
essence itself. As we’ve just seen for Aristotle the possession of the Knowledge 
of being concerns God and not the human being, however this divine science is 
deserving to be desired and honored and, in order to do that, the man must 
research mainly this science, i.e. he must philosophize.  
       But does philosophy really coincide with metaphysics? Is it possible for 
the continuous embodying of being which has to be seen in the history of 
philosophy - in particular by Aristotle – to disclose the being qua being?  
The way which brings one to truth, as Aristotle well alerted, is difficult, but the 
very beginning of his  Metaphysics ‘All men by nature desire to know’2, seems 
to be of good omen for this research.  
Will philosophy be able to descend in order to be in man’s reach?  
 
§ 2. The disappointing question about nothing 
 
‘Why are there beings at all, and why not far rather Nothing?’3, asked 
Heidegger at the end of What is Metaphysics?. With this point the 
reconfiguration of philosophy prospected by Leo Lugarini begins - i.e. the 
investigation of ‘what must be understood under philosophy; does philosophy 
in itself really coincide with metaphysics or does it cover a different 
configuration?’4. 
On the basis of this question the necessity to overcome metaphysics as well as 
the consequent reconfiguration of philosophy emerges. Moreover, in What is 
metaphysics? Heidegger specifies his metaphysical interest in the nothing with 
these words: ‘The nothing does not merely serve as the counterconcept of 
beings; rather, it originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such. In the 
being of beings the nihilation of the nothing occurs’5. 
According to Heidegger, metaphysics with its persisting research into the first 
and privileged essence has lost its original aim: being itself, which remains 
hidden under the blunders of human scientific investigation, pretends through a 
representational thought to ‘explore the thing from outside, in such a way, to 
                                                             
1 Ivi, book VII, 1624. 
2 Ivi, book I, 1552. 
3 Heidegger, M. (1929), 96. 
4 Lugarini, L. (1964), 9. Translation by the Author.  
5 Heidegger, M. (1929), 91. 
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apprehend it intrinsically’1. On that account, metaphysics remains ignorant of 
its own foundation, as expressed clearly by Lugarini:  
 
Metaphysics, by Heidegger, consists in such a manner of thought which 
in the lack of caution of these oblivions has its proper (ill-founded) 
foundation, i.e. its own original dimension; which not only thinks being 
ignoring its difference from essence, but also, as a principle, it escapes to 
everything that diverges from the essence.  What must be realized, 
instead, is the absolute other of the essence which is hidden inside it as 
its constitutive moment. By Heidegger the realization that it’s only by the 
force of the absolute other of itself that the essence could be eventually 
grounded is the first step towards overcoming metaphysics.
2
 
 
The absolute other of the essence is just nothing, which directs us in front of 
being and places us in question. But, it must be asked, when and how could we 
experience the nothing? Heidegger has identified a properly human mood 
which brings man forward to the nothing itself: Angst [Anxiety] characterized 
from ‘the indeterminateness of that in the face of which and concerning which 
we become anxious […]’3, the fact that there is nothing, any-thing, to become 
anxious about. What was impossible in the metaphysical perspective actually 
happened: the essence’s disappearance.  
       What remains now? The nothing or perhaps the very searched for being 
hidden behind the essence? 
 Certainly we, as human beings, are there for the first time; our being alone 
with the nothing, the only one who could give us the key to Being’s door:  
 
The question of the nothing puts us, the questioners, ourselves in 
question. It is a metaphysical question. Human Dasein can comport itself 
toward beings only if it holds itself out into the nothing. Going beyond 
beings occurs in the essence of Dasein. But this going beyond is 
metaphysics itself. This implies that metaphysics belongs to the “nature 
of the human being”. It is neither a division of academic philosophy nor 
a field of arbitrary notions. Metaphysics is the fundamental occurrence 
in our Dasein. It is that Dasein itself.
4
 
 
Here is Metaphysics again, but haven’t we exceeded it? The Metaphysics we 
face now has its foundation in Being, and we discover ourselves inside it as 
existential beings. The original meaning of the word «metaphysics» has not 
been cancelled but re-grounded: the being-in-itself couldn’t take place in the 
several essences analyzed in the history of philosophy, because between being 
and essence there’s a profound difference: ‘on one side there is essence, “what 
every time is essence”, on the other side there is being, “what enables the 
essence to be effectively essence and not instead no-thing”, which is to say 
                                                             
1 Lugarini, L. (1964), 24. Translation by the Author.  
2 Ivi, 48. Translation by the Author. 
3 Heidegger, M. (1929), 88. 
4 Ivi, 96.  
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“what in the essence, if it’s properly an essence, constitutes the being”. 
Therefore the ontological difference appears’1.  
       With attention to the ontological difference we can look at ancient 
philosophy investigating the original grounds which have never been seen 
before, in this sense we can say that metaphysics, after being overcome, wakes 
up and re-starts as necessary to the existential human being. It can be said, 
indeed, that man is intrinsically metaphysics as much as, thanks to the 
encounter with nothing, he will find himself above and over the essence itself 
in its totality. Metaphysics onto-logically structured has been discovered to be 
a particular configuration of philosophy, not philosophy itself, which as we 
have seen is already beyond metaphysics together with the human being, its 
artificer. 
 
§ 3. Hegel’s reconfiguration: experience 
 
Man speaks the language of Being as his own nature and, for instance, it will 
be possible for him to achieve the truth of Being, of what is appropriate for 
him. 
Heidegger had perceived that truth must be searched in ourselves, and what 
needs to be in question was properly the existential being, however the turn in 
this direction was already taken by Hegel, who had proposed an authentic 
phenomenology of knowledge.  
       In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel expresses the necessity for 
philosophy to become  a science, i.e. that the knowledge is self-guaranteed and 
constitutes, in such a way, the measure and the support of philosophical 
thought. 
Through the journey of the Phenomenology of Spirit, which brings 
consciousness step by step from sense-certainty to the absolute knowing, the 
raising of philosophy to science will be realized. Through this process it will be 
later discovered that the journey itself, which has an introductory function, is 
already the philosophical and scientific knowledge.  
       Human knowledge and truth are no longer opposites because the absolute 
knowing is implicitly at the beginning of the philosophical path. It couldn’t be 
otherwise. In fact: if there were a difference between consciousness and the 
object, who could guarantee that the object would be really knowable by 
consciousness?  
This critical operation of the intellect, typical of gnoseologism, is soundly 
expressed in the Introduction of the  Phenomenology of Spirit:  
 
[…] if the Absolute is supposed merely to be brought nearer to us 
through this instrument, without anything in it being altered, like a bird 
caught by a lime-twing, it would surely laugh our little ruse to scorn, if it 
were not with us, in and for itself, all along, and of its own volition. For a 
ruse is just what cognition would be in such a case, since it would, with 
its manifold exertions, be giving itself the air of doing something quite 
                                                             
1 Lugarini, L. (1964), 42. Translation by the Author. 
ATINER CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES No: PHI2012-0149 
11 
 
different from creating a merely immediate and therefore effortless 
relationship.
1
 
 
       The exposition of how knowledge makes its appearance
2
 is the way chosen 
by Hegel to explain the necessity of knowledge to become science. Here he 
speaks of appearance that designates the truth which develops itself as 
actuality: ‘Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise 
and pass away, but is “in itself” [i.e. subsists intrinsically], and constitutes the 
actuality and the movement of the life of truth’3. The phenomenon is its proper 
appearance. In this sense appearance and truth belong to the same root, they 
are not opposed, false. Instead being another thing from truth, there is a 
transition from the form to the act as Lugarini said in his Philosophy and 
Metaphysics:  
 
The Standpoint assumed here characterizes itself for the being-with-us of 
the absolute, i.e. of “what in actuality is” or, preferably, of “truth” itself, 
in general. The absolute’s being-with-us indicates its original presence 
for consciousness; ergo involves that truth, in general, from the 
beginning and then is always given clearly to us, on the other side, we 
are originally by the truth although we don’t see it. Therefore 
Erscheinung and Wahrheit simply cease to oppose themselves.
4
  
 
       Hegel gives to philosophy a conversion which reconfigures philosophy as 
a science of the experience of consciousness, the step only drafted by 
Heidegger is realized by Hegel: the absolute knowing must be sought in human 
consciousness. Its performance articulates the development of truth that 
unearths in every step the reality itself. 
 
For this reason it must be said that nothing is known that is not in 
experience, or, as it is also expressed, that is not felt to be true, not given 
as an inwardly revealed eternal verity, as something sacred that is 
believed, or whatever other expressions have been used. For experience 
is just this, that the content – which is Spirit – is in itself substance, and 
therefore is an object of consciousness. But this substance which is Spirit 
is the process in which Spirit becomes what it is in itself; and it is only as 
this process of reflecting itself into itself that it is in itself truly Spirit. It is 
in itself the movement which is cognition – the transforming of that in-
itself into that which is for itself, of Substance into Subject, of the object 
of consciousness into an object of self-consciousness, i.e. into an object 
that is just as much superseded, or into the Notion. The movement is the 
                                                             
1 Hegel, G. W. F. (1807), Phenomenology of Spirit translated by A. V. Miller, Oxford 
University Press 1977, 47. 
2 Ivi, 49. 
3 Ivi, 27. 
4 Lugarini, L. (1964), 26. Translation by the Author. 
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circle that returns into itself, the circle that presupposes its beginning 
and reaches it only at the end”.1 
 
       Experience represents a crucial moment in Phenomenology of Spirit, 
which transforms the immediate identity of thought and being in a mediate one: 
‘Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it, this dialectical movement 
which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge 
and its object, is precisely what is called experience [Erfahrung]’.2 
Then, without experience, no knowledge would exist for human beings. 
Philosophy is rooted in the experience of consciousness that asks itself what is, 
for itself, knowledge: ‘Consciousness provides its own criterion from within 
itself, so that the investigation becomes a comparison of consciousness with 
itself […]’.3 
Experience, phenomenologically intended, reaches a total amplitude, 
comprehending in itself the whole of the conscious life, so, in its 
phenomenological sense experience includes the whole system of 
consciousness, i.e. its entire world.  Because it embraces the entire system of 
consciousness
4
, the phenomenological attitude of observing and receiving the 
thing as it gives itself means ‘to penetrate in us in order to chase and receive, as 
it gives itself, the original movement of rising up and developing the “thing” 
itself into the horizon of our experience’5. In the whole conscience’s horizon, 
whose field of activity is the entirety of conscious life, the absolute knowing 
will constitute philosophy as a science. Absolute knowing appears in the 
moment in which consciousness catches in itself its essence; i.e. when there’s a 
correspondence between concept and object. When finally phenomenon fits 
essence or truth, phenomenology of spirit becomes actually science:  
 
Whereas in the phenomenology of Spirit each moment is the difference of 
knowledge and Truth, and is the movement in which that difference is 
cancelled, Science on the other hand does not contain this difference and 
the cancelling of it. On the contrary, since the moment has the form of 
the Notion, it unites the objective form of Truth and of the knowing Self in 
an immediate unity.
6
  
 
       After having covered the way we - as consciousness - unfold, Hegel’s 
Phenomenology embraces the human’s work in all its universality. The 
absolute knowing contains in itself all the shapes of spirit, however, being itself 
properly a shape, absolute knowing cancels the other shapes, but in reality it re-
claims them removing their spilt chronological dimension:  
 
                                                             
1 Hegel, G. W. F. (1807) , 487-488. 
2 Ivi, 55. 
3 Ivi, 53. 
4 Ivi, 56. 
5 Lugarini, L. (1964), 105. Translation by the Author.  
6 Hegel, G. W. F. (1807), 491. 
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As its fulfilment consists in perfectly knowing what it is, in knowing its 
substance, this knowing is its withdrawal into itself in which it abandons 
its outer existence and gives its existential shape over to recollection. 
Thus absorbed in itself, it is sunk in the night of its self-consciousness; 
but in that night its vanished outer existence is preserved, and this 
transformed existence – the former one, but now reborn of the Spirit’s 
knowledge – is the new existence, a new world and a new shape of Spirit. 
In the immediacy of this new existence the Spirit has to start afresh to 
bring itself to maturity as if, for it, all that preceded were lost and it had 
learned nothing from the experience of the earlier Spirits. But 
recollection, the inwardizing, of that experience, has preserved it and is 
the inner being, and in fact the higher form of the substance.
1
  
 
       Spirit is aware that it must to go back. Absolute knowing is not a static 
unity, but has a strong tension. Hegel could not have said where this tension 
will lead, surely his opened door will not ever be closed. It was then Husserl 
who continued the phenomenological proceeding and who has properly gone 
back to the drawing-board. 
 
§ 4. Husserl’s reconfiguration: phenomenology of Lebenswelt 
 
Husserl’s reconfiguration of philosophy describes itself as a phenomenology of 
Lebenswelt which has our everyday life as a primary theme. In the conjunction 
of philosophy and life-world there’s a definitive break with the metaphysical 
tradition, which was configured as a question about the essence from a higher 
point of view.  
       Nevertheless, Husserl distinguishes from the ancient tradition ‘what he 
considers as an “authentic metaphysics”, qua “universal science of supreme 
grounds of being”. For its features of researching what is ultimate, the 
authentic metaphysics coincides, according to Husserl, with “first philosophy”. 
The erste Philosophie asserts itself as the main theme, into the program to 
establish the rigorous scientificity of philosophy’2. The task of establishing   a 
first authentic philosophy reflects the original aims of classical metaphysics as 
Aristotle had designed although never realized. Husserl with his transcendental 
phenomenology wanted to realize it. The results of philosophy as a rigorous 
science are surely ‘metaphysical, if it be true that ultimate cognitions of being 
should be called metaphysical.On the other hand, what we have here is 
anything but metaphysics in the customary sense: a historically degenerate 
metaphysics, which by no means conforms to the sense with which 
metaphysics, as “first philosophy”, was instituted originally. Phenomenology’s 
purely intuitive, concrete, and also apodictic mode of demonstration excludes 
all “metaphysical adventure”, all speculative excesses’3.  
                                                             
1 Ivi, 492. 
2 Lugarini, L. (1964), 143. Translation by the Author. 
3 Husserl, E. Cartesian Meditations  (1929),  translated by Dorion Cairns, Netherlands: 
Springer - Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999, 139. 
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Under first philosophy, Husserl intends, the one in itself first, on the basis of 
essence’s internal grounds and, for its priority, the other sciences must underlie 
it and will be named, for instance, second philosophies. In the new conception 
of philosophy through phenomenology, the epoché, i.e. putting into parenthesis 
the persuasions counted as valid, including all sciences, assures that anything 
will be presupposed as already given: it’s not possible thinking about 
something known outside the knowledge itself. Once obtained, through epoché, 
the apodictic evidence of ego cogito, we assist at the appearance of something 
which gives itself evidently to our conscience; i.e. the phenomenon or the 
Sache selbst. In this way, the radical new beginning of every rigorous 
knowledge resides in the dimension of the things’ authentic appearance and in 
the consequent stance of receiving phenomena as they are in themselves; 
precisely this stance was possible through the phenomenological epoché.  
       In the Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology (1935), Husserl identifies the crisis of European sciences in 
their not making a question out of their manner of proceeding, rather than in 
the issue of not achieving results. Questioning the activity one is engaged in is 
the essential point of beginning of philosophize. The credit of Cartesian doubt 
lies just in this radical skepsis which critically puts man at the center of his 
activity, as Leo Lugarini claims: ‘In the Cartesian doubt, Husserl discovers the 
results to show that at least one thing is certain: “that I doubt and, further, that 
this world appears to me sensibly, that I have now these and those perceptions, 
that I judge them so and so […]’1.  
       What remains left to do for the phenomenologically reduced ego? As 
Hegel would have said, it remains only the reine Zusehen:  
 
We can describe the situation also on the following manner. If the Ego, 
as naturally immersed in the world, experiencingly and otherwise, is 
called “interested” in the world, then the phenomenologically altered – 
and, as so altered, continually maintained – attitude consists in a 
splitting of the Ego: in that the phenomenological Ego establishes 
himself as “disinterested onlooker”, above the naïvely interested Ego».2  
 
Thanks to the transcendental conversion, philosophy can restart from the ego 
who ‘can become the “non-participant onlooker” at himself – including 
furthermore every Objectivity that “is” for him, and as it is for him’3.  
       After having gained self-certainty, and therefore having landed at the level 
of transcendental subjectivity, it sets the problem of coming out from this 
solipsism. If the previous reductions have reduced the other to own and, in 
general, the world to my conscience’s sphere; how could the solus-ipse meet 
the other-egos-for-itself?  
In front of the same landscape, two different egos surely have several 
perceptions of the single view; nevertheless the fact that the first ego could 
replace the second ego occupying its position, i.e. swapping places with the 
                                                             
1 Lugarini, L. (1964), 163. Translation by the Author. 
2 Husserl, E. (1929), 35. 
3 Ivi, 37. 
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first one, and even then being in front of the same horizon, experiencing - 
through empathy – its same feelings, this simple situation attests that: ‘there 
can exist only a single community of monads, the community of all co-existing 
monads’1. Here we are arrived at the last step of transcendental reduction: 
intersubjectivity. Thanks to this final step the lost world, put into parenthesis at 
the beginning of the phenomenological process, has been regained: but is it the 
same world? Is Husserl’s thought one of the several philosophical doors which 
could be closed after him? Surely not, after all: how could we close again our 
own door?  
       Husserl’s phenomenology, as already Hegel’s, takes sense from ourselves. 
Such a philosophy, based on the existential being, as Heidegger wished, will 
certainly not ever come to an end:  
 
The Delphic motto, “Know thyself!” has gained a new signification. 
Positive science is a science lost in the world. I must lose the world by 
epoché, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination. “Noli foras 
ire,” says Augustine, “in te redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas’.2  
 
Conclusion 
 
What is to be obtained through the reconfiguration of philosophy? 
Is this reconfiguration definitive or is it a never-ending process? 
 
The investigation has reached an unexpected result. The experienced 
result is the radical transformation of the same meaning of the question 
of ground: philosophy’s basis, rather than being essence, being or 
factual, is what brings us to conceive essence or  being to one hand and, 
on the other hand, to limit and maintain us into factual. We are ourselves 
ground, i.e. what happens in interiore homine.
3
  
 
So Lugarini claims commenting on the outcome of the developed way. 
Actually, it’s not possible to speak about a conclusion if we hold to 
philosophical task as Hegel, Heidegger, Husserl and Lugarini had all intended 
it. What does appear to a not naïve philosopher, epochizing, beyond Magritte’s 
door? An unexpected answer: staying in the doorway in order to not follow 
again into intellectualism which pretends to embrace everything.  
       At the end, what does it mean to be arrived? If truth, as we’ve discovered, 
lives in ourselves we must give a new sense to the objects we encounter in the 
life-world, i.e. giving a new sense to philosophy.  
       It’s now understandable in which way in front of Magritte’s door the man 
breaks it with his human figure in order to gain his original position, 
renouncing at the beginning the more comfortable and misleading habit of 
opening philosophy’s door and going beyond.  
                                                             
1 Ivi, 140. 
2 Ivi, 157. 
3 Lugarini, L. (1964), 182. Translation by the Author. 
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       Being on the look-out at the middle of oneself as the door, occupying such 
an uncomfortable and difficult position for man, who is constantly tempted to 
cross easier ways promising a comprehensive knowledge they will not acquire, 
begs man to reconfigure his own knowledge every time it goes away from the 
conscious life’s internal intentionality, never giving up to tiredness.  
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Figure 1. The Unexpected Answer, René Magritte 1933 
 
